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Preferential Economic Treatment for Women:
Some Constitutional and Practical Implications of
Kahn v. Shevin
"The tax being upon persons, women may be exempted on the basis of special
considerations to which they are naturally entitled."
Butler, J., in Breedlove v. Suttles,
302 U.S. 277, 282 (1937).
"It will need more than the Nineteenth Amendment to convince me that there
are no differences between men and women, or that legislation cannot take
those differences into account."
Holmes, J., dissenting, in Adkins v.

Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525,
569-70 (1923).
I.

INTRODUCTION

For nearly one hundred years the legal status of American
women has been undergoing a painfully slow and haphazard process
of redefinition in state and federal courts. Long-regarded by the
judiciary as having her primary (and proper) place in society as wife
and mother' and as requiring special legislative protections for her
welfare when she did work outside the home,2 the American woman
has frequently found herself subjected to stereotyped treatment by
laws that, although allegedly enacted for her benefit, in reality
served to bar her completely from numerous occupations3 or hampered her ability to obtain lucrative overtime pay. 4
With the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5
a viable means of attacking "protective" labor legislation became
available to women. Furthermore, Title VII soon proved its worth
to men seeking to abolish sex-based discrimination against them in
areas such as employment' and retirement benefits. 7 The Supreme
1. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961) (upholding a state statute excluding women from jury service unless they applied); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130,
141 (1873) (approving the state's exclusion of women from the legal profession).
2. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding a state statute fixing
maximum hours of work for women).
3. E.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (statute prohibiting women from serving
as bartenders unless they were the proprieter's wife or daughter).
4. E.g., Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671
(1914).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970).
6. E.g., Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1970) (being female not a bona fide occupational qualification for job of flight
cabin attendant and airline's refusal to hire men solely because of their sex violated Title VII).
7. E.g., Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973) (Title VII
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Court decisions of Reed v. Reed8 and Frontiero v. Richardson9 also
appeared to indicate that equal protection under the fifth and fourteenth amendments demanded governmental treatment of men and
women on an individual basis and that traditional sex-stereotyping
could no longer serve as a valid legislative foundation for different
treatment of the sexes in areas in which individuals were similarly
situated.
In April 1974, however, a Supreme Court decision appeared
that cast some doubt on the precise standard to be used in evaluating legislation granting women economic benefits that are withheld
from men. In upholding a property tax exemption statute for widows
in Kahn v. Shevin, 0 the Court used language that suggested a retreat from the "strict scrutiny" approach of the Frontieroplurality"
and appeared once again to accept the concept of a society in which
men are the breadwinners and women are full-time homemakers.
While Kahn can arguably be limited to its facts, 2 its underlying
rationale 3 could easily be extended to areas other than state tax
law- for example, divorce and property settlement laws, the social
security benefit structure, and other areas in which laws traditionally have discriminated economically in favor of women. This Note
will attempt to analyze the legal soundness and social utility of the
underlying premise of the Kahn decision, and to evaluate, to a
limited extent, the case's potential impact on other areas of the law.
Toward this end, a number of relevant state and lower federal court
cases arising before and after Kahn will be examined, including
several decided by the Supreme Court this term.
II. FROM Bradwell TO Frontiero:GRADUAL

EROSION OF "THE LAW OF

THE CREATOR"

It has recently been suggested that the performance of the
American judiciary in most pre-1971 sex discrimination cases could
be described as "ranging from poor to abominable."" To a
violated by pension arrangement allowing women to retire earlier on full pension).
8. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
9. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
10. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
11. 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
12. The majority opinion noted that the case involved a state tax law, a particular type
of legislation traditionally accorded substantial deference by courts, even where equal protection challenges are involved. 416 U.S. 351, 355-56 & n.9 (1974).
13. Id. at 354 & n.7 & 360-61 (White, J., dissenting).
14. Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discriminationby Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective,
46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 675, 676 (1971).

1975]

KAHN V. SHEVIN

twentieth-century reader of an 1873 Supreme Court decision upholding Illinois' right to bar women from the practice of law, Justice
Bradley's pronouncements on the fundamental distinctions between
the natures and destinies of the sexes are the hallmark of the nineteenth century bench's view of the rights of women:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things,
indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests
and views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from
that of her husband.
It is true that many women are unmarried and not affected by any of the
duties, complications, and incapacities arising out of the married state, but
these are exceptions to the general rule. The paramount destiny and mission
of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is
the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the
general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases.' 5

Thus characterized and categorized by the laws of both the
Creator and the United States Supreme Court, women continued to
be viewed by state legislatures and courts as fragile, delicate creatures who unquestionably were destined for roles as wives and mothers. Given this basic assumption, the state naturally had a duty to
protect the health of women who for some reason were financially
compelled to work outside the home, and, consequently, many
states enacted so-called "protective labor laws" for the benefit of
working women. Although differing in various respects, the majority
of these statutes set maximum hours or minimum wages for women
workers or completely barred women from certain occupations that
the legislature deemed dangerous or potentially injurious to the
health, morals, or general welfare of women.
In 1908 the Supreme Court sustained the first constitutional
challenge to one of these statutes in Muller v. Oregon."8 In sanctioning the state's right to impose a maximum hours per day restriction
on female employees, the Court reasoned that Oregon had legitimately exercised its police powers since "[A woman's] physical
structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions-having
in view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the
race-justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the
passion of men . . . . "17 Muller was followed by other Supreme
15. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141-42 (1873).
16. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
17. Id. at 422.
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Court cases that sanctioned a wide variety of protective labor laws
aimed at women, ranging from regulation of their working hours 8
to minimum wage requirements.' 9 And in 1948, the Court in
Goesaert v. Cleary" upheld a statute prohibiting, in cities over a
certain size, the employment of a woman bartender unless she was
the proprietor's wife or daughter.
Despite the judicial assumptions underlying the decisions upholding protective legislation that all women could validly be
treated as equally possessing the same physical capabilities and
that they were benefitted by the laws in question, it was soon realized that in many instances "protective" labor legislation prevented
women from obtaining jobs for which they were actually wellqualified and enabled employers to reserve higher-paying jobs for
men by including in the job classification duties that women were
statutorily forbidden to perform. With the enactment of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ' however, and the subsequent promulgation of federal guidelines stating that all "protective" restrictions on employment of women conflicted with Title VII, 22 many of
the statutes began to be either invalidated by court decisions2 or
repealed by state legislatures. 24 The courts interpreted the policy of
Title VII to require employers to consider only the abilities of the
individual and to forbid stereotypical treatment on the basis of
sex.r2
Title VII's legislative mandate of individual treatment extended equally to private employment practices26 as well as state
18. See, e.g., Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (statute prohibiting employment
of women in restaurants during the late evening and early morning hours); Bosley v.
McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915)(maximum hour law for female hospital employees); Miller
v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915)(maximum hour law for women working in hotels); Riley v.
Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914)(maximum hour limitations for women factory workers).
19. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
20. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970).
22. 29 C.F.R. 1604.2(b)(1)(1974).
23. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971)(weightlifting restrictions); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529
(1971)(statute prohibiting employing women in bars); Jones Metal Products Co. v. Walker,
29 Ohio St. 2d 173, 281 N.E.2d 1 (1972)(statute limiting maximum hours of work for women).
24. See, e.g., Aiz. SEss. LAws ch. 133, §§ 35, 58 (1973), repealingAmz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-261 (1971); ARiz. SEss. LAws ch. 69, § 1 (1970), repealing Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-281
(1956); 55 DEL. LAws, ch. 218 (1965), repealingDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 301-35 (1953).
25. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1969); Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089, 1096 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Richards v. Griffith Rubber
Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338, 340 (D. Ore. 1969); see 29 C.F.R. 1604.2(a)(1)(ii)(1974).
26. Title VII was amended in 1972 to cover employers (in commerce-affecting industries) who have 15 or more employees, as opposed to the original Act's coverage of only those
employers with 25 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1970).
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legislation, and to discrimination against men as well as against
women. Consequently, male plaintiffs began to bring Title VII suits
to force employers to consider them, on the basis of their qualifications, for jobs traditionally available only to women. In Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways,2" the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the defendant airline's policy of hiring only women as flight
cabin attendants violated Title VII. The court stressed Pan Am's
right to "take into consideration the ability of individuals" to perform the job, but held that the airline could not exclude all males
simply because some or even most could not perform certain duties
adequately.2 Two years later, in Rosen v. Public Service Electric &
Gas Co.,29 the Third Circuit relied on Title VII to invalidate a pension plan that allowed women to retire earlier, with full benefits,
than could their male counterparts.
An examination of these and other Title VII cases reveals a
judicial shift of attitude in sex-discrimination cases; a shift brought
on, however, only by Congressional legislation directed almost exclusively at employment discrimination. In other areas not affected
by Title VII, the separate and protected status traditionally accorded women and formerly evidenced in protective labor legislation
has persisted and until recently easily withstood equal protection
challenges in the courts. In Gruenwald v. Gardner,3 the Second
Circuit upheld the validity of a social security provision 3' under
which the benefits computation formula for women allowed them to
use three fewer "elapsed years" than could similarly situated men.
By effectively eliminating years of lower earnings in the computation of the "average monthly wage" from which the primary insurance amount was determined, the challenged section economically
favored women over men, but the court held the statute did not
under the fifth amendment. 32 Using the
violate equal protection
"rational relationship ' 33 rather than the "strict scrutiny"34 test, the
27. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
28. Id. at 388 (emphasis in original).
29. 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973).
30. 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3)(1970).
32. "[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid
discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.'" Schneider v. Rusk,
377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969); Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
33. Under this test, a legislative classification will be sustained whenever it bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,82 HAav. L. Rav. 1065, 1077-87 (1969).
34. A legislative classification based on a suspect category (race, national ancestry or
alienage), or impinging on a fundamental interest (e.g., the right to vote, to procreate, or to
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court found that the more lenient benefits computation formula for
women workers was a reasonable means to achieve the objective of
the statute-the "reduction of the disparity between the economic
and physical capabilities" of men and women. 5
In reaching its decision, the Gruenwald court relied on a 1961
3 6 for the proposition that speSupreme Court case, Hoyt v. Florida,
cial recognition and favored treatment constitutionally could be
afforded to women. 7 In Hoyt, the Supreme Court was asked to
invalidate a statute exempting all women from jury duty unless they
voluntarily placed themselves on an eligible list. In an opinion uncannily reminiscent of Justice Bradley's concurring opinion in
Bradwell ninety years previously, the majority upheld the challenged statute:
Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and
protections of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of community life
formerly considered to be reserved to men, woman is still regarded as the
center of home and family life. We cannot say that it is constitutionally impermissible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to conclude that
a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service unless she
herself determines that such service is inconsistent with her own special responsibilities.38

Not until ten years after Hoyt did the Supreme Court finally
seem to recognize the inequities that can be perpetuated by judicial
adherence to the type of stereotypical assumptions about the sexes
so clearly evidenced in Bradwell and Hoyt. In 1971 and 1973 the
Court heard and decided two sex-discrimination cases that seemed
to herald a more contemporary and enlightened approach to the
validity of sex-based classifications-an approach requiring inquiry
into individual qualifications rather than permitting legislation on
the basis of assumed class characteristics.
In Reed v. Reed,39 the Court invalidated an Ohio probate statute providing that, when two individuals were otherwise equally
entitled to appointment as administrator of an estate, the male
applicant was to be preferred over the female. The state argued that
the statute was a reasonable measure designed to reduce the workload on probate courts by eliminating one class of contests, and that
the mandatory preference for males was in itself reasonable since
travel interstate) will be sustained only if it is narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state
interest. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Developments-Equal Protection,
supra note 33, at 1120-23, 1127-31.
35. Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591, 592 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,393 U.S. 982 (1968).
36. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
37. 390 F.2d at 592.
38. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961).
39. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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men are as a rule more conversant with business affairs than are
women and therefore in general are better qualified to act as administrators. Applying what some courts and commentators subsequently characterized as a "new" or "strengthened" rational relationship test,4" the Court held the statute violative of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, since it failed to
bear a "fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." 4
The following term, in Frontierov. Richardson, 2 a plurality of
the Supreme Court declared sex to be a suspect category in invalidating a federal statute under which female members of the armed
forces were required to demonstrate that their spouses were actually
dependent upon them in order to obtain certain dependents' benefits, whereas male members' spouses were automatically considered
dependents for purposes of the statute. Finding "implicit support"4 3
in Reed for its holding that sex constituted a suspect category, the
plurality rejected the government's administrative convenience justification offered in support of the statute.4 Furthermore, after expressly disapproving Bradwell's "law of the Creator" language as a
classic example of "romantic paternalism,"4 5 the plurality identified
the crucial defect underlying sex-based classifications:
*

.

. [W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statutes as intelligence

or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that
the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society. As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes
often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to
inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual
members."

Careful analysis of the Reed and Frontiero opinions fails to
yield significant guidance as to the precise standards to be used in
evaluating sex-based classifications. Clearly, the plurality opinion
in Frontierodid not definitively determine that sex-based classifications were suspect, and the first sex discrimination cases that followed Frontiero evidenced judicial uncertainty over the import of
40. See, e.g., Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 1973); Wark v. Robbins,
458 F.2d 1295, 1297 n.4 (1st Cir. 1972)(dictum). See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court
1971 Term-Forward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a ChangingCourt, 86 HARv. L. REv.
1 (1972); Getman, The Emerging ConstitutionalPrincipleof Sexual Equality, 1972 SUP. CT.
REv. 157.
41. 404 U.S. at 76 (quoting from Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)).
42. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
43. Id. at 682.
44. Id. at 688-90.
45. Id. at 684-85.
46. Id. at 686-87.
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47 As one court stated, however, regardless
both Reed and Frontiero.
of the lack of definitive guidelines in the two decisions, Reed and
Frontiero may be read as "an expression of deep concern by the
Supreme Court to analyze statutory classifications based upon sex
in more pragmatic terms of this everyday modern world rather than

in the stereotyped generalizations of the Victorian age.

48

Such a

reading easily comports with the Court's explicit reference in
Frontieroto "actual capabilities of individual members"4 of the two
sexes, a phrase clearly calling for individualized treatment of similarly situated women and men rather than legislation grounded in
stereotyped sex-based assumptions.
If Frontierocan justifiably be read as requiring narrowly drawn
legislation designed to reach similarly situated persons of both
sexes, then statutes granting women special benefits not conferred
upon men would seem to be constitutionally impermissible. The
plurality opinion in Frontiero, however, while unhesitatingly characterizing sex as a suspect category and stating that sex-based classifications must be subjected to "strict judicial scrutiny,""0 observed
in a footnote that the statutes considered in Frontierowere not "in
any sense designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination
against women." 51 This observation could be interpreted as implying that statutes with "ameliorative" purposes might not be found
to violate equal protection, an implication somewhat at odds with
the traditional "strict scrutiny" standard unless the ameliorative
purpose and the means used to effect it could be held to pass the
"compelling state interest" test-a test which has seldom, if ever,
52
been met.

47.

See, e.g., Ballard v. Laird, 360 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd, 43 U.S.L.W.

4158 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1975) (district court relied on Frontieroas establishing sex as a suspect
category); Bowen v. Hackett, 361 F. Supp. 854 (D.R.I. 1973) (court admitted difficulty in
determining appropriate standard of review from Frontieroopinion but concluded that statute at issue failed to meet even Reed's rational basis test); M. v. M., - Del. , 321 A.2d
115 (1974) (court characterized Frontiero'splurality opinion as "enlightening but not controlling" and held that statute in question met both the rational basis and strict scrutiny tests);
State v. Chambers, 63 N.J. 287, 307 A.2d 78 (1973) (using Frontieroas the basis for invoking
the strict scrutiny test). For an analysis of the standard of review used in 6 federal and state
court sex discrimination cases (including Ballard and Chambers) decided shortly after
Frontiero, see 23 CATH. U.L. Rav. 599 (1974).
48. Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981, 988 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd, 43
U.S.L.W. 4393 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1975).
49. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973).
50. Id. at 688.
51. Id. at 689 n.22. The Court cited Gruenwald v. Gardner,390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968) and some school desegregation cases.
52. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972)(Burger, C.J., dissenting). But
see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in which the Court apparently found that the states
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Following Frontiero,equal protection attacks on statutes granting women preferential treatment met with varying degrees of success. In at least three areas-social security legislation, divorce and
property settlement law, and military promotion regulations-Frontierowas relied on by plaintiffs seeking extension of
"women only" legislative benefits to men. It is not remarkable that
the results of these cases are far from uniform, given the lack of a
definitive holding in Frontiero. Nevertheless, an examination of
some selected cases in these areas is instructive in demonstrating
the continuing reluctance on the part of some courts to accept a
standard of individualized treatment of the sexes and to abandon
the kinds of assumptions supposedly left behind in Bradwell.
A.

The Social Security Benefits Cases

The social security benefits computation formula53 upheld by
the Second Circuit in 1968 in Gruenwald v. Gardner54 was again
challenged, subsequent to Frontiero, in three federal district court
cases, two of which preceded the Kahn decision. In both McEvoy
v. Weinberger5 5 and Polelle v. Secretary of HEW" the courts held
that the benefits provision in question met both the strict scrutiny
and rational basis tests. Characterizing the statutory formula as
"designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination against
women," 57 the McEvoy court simultaneously held the classification
"reasonably related" to achieving a legitimate legislative purpose,
while finding a "compelling governmental interest" present in the
reduction of economic disparity between the sexes. In a slightly
more limited holding, the Polelle court found that reduction of economic disparity between the sexes that is the result of past or present discrimination provided a compelling governmental interest in
sustaining the statute. 59 Thus both courts seemed to accept as viable
the premise that Frontiero could require a "strict scrutiny" standard of review for statutes granting women preferential treatment.
Both courts, however, also apparently felt (although without articucould have a compelling interest in safeguarding the health of the mother and the life of the
foetus and thus prohibit abortions after the second trimester of pregnancy.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3)(1970).
54. 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968).
55. Civ. No. 72-1727-Civ.-JE (S.D. Fla., Aug. 28, 1973).
56. Civ. No. 73-C-774 (N.D. Ill., Apr. 19, 1974)(three-judge panel).
57. McEvoy v. Weinberger, Civ. No. 72-1727-Civ.-JE (S.D. Fla., Aug. 28, 1973), slip
opinion at 2. The quoted language appears to have been taken directly from footnote 22 in
Frontiero, although no direct citation was made by the court.
58. Id.
59. Civ. No. 73-C-774 (N.D. Ill.,
Apr. 19, 1974), slip opinion at 6-7.
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lating the rationale or authority supporting their conclusions) that
reducing the economic disparities between the earning capabilities
of the sexes (by compensating for the effects of past discrimination
against women in the job market) was a sufficiently compelling
governmental interest to justify use of a "suspect category" as the
basis for classification.
A much more careful examination of Frontieroand its implications was conducted by a district court in another social security
benefits case, Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare." The plaintiff, a widower, attacked the constitutionality of
the "mother's insurance benefits" provision of the social security
statute, which grants certain additional benefits to widows with
children and "surviving divorced mothers" but does not provide
similar benefits for widowers with children or surviving divorced
fathers. During his wife's employment as a teacher, maximum social
security payments had been deducted from her paychecks, whereas
the plaintiff had been employed only sporadically during the few
years of their marriage, his wife's total earnings far exceeding his.
In ascertaining the proper standard of review for judging the
statute's constitutionality, the district court in Wiesenfeld carefully
reviewed the various opinions in Frontieroand noted that a majority
of the Supreme Court had not yet declared sex to be a suspect
category. The district court examined and rejected the interpretation of Reed and Frontiero as creating an "intermediate test" for
sex-based legislative discrimination.12 The court then analyzed the
statutory benefits provision, using the traditional rational basis
test. While noting that "[i]t is often difficult for courts to determine the specific purpose behind congressional legislation especially
60. 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 4393 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1975).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1970) provides in pertinent part as follows:
(1) The widow and every surviving divorced mother. . .of an individual who died
a fully or currently insured individual, if such widow or surviving divorced mother(E) at the time of filing such application has in her care a child of such individual
entitled to a child's insurance benefit...
* * * shall . . .be entitled to a mother's insurance benefit for each month [until
the occurrence of certain specified events such a remarriage, the failure of the child to
continue to qualify for child's insurance benefits, etc.]
(2) Such mother's insurance benefit for each month shall be equal to three-fourths
of the primary insurance amount of such deceased individual.
62. 367 F. Supp. at 988. The Wiesenfeld court examined Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920), from which Chief Justice Burger quoted in Reed to obtain the "fair
and substantial relation" language that later received much attention from commentators,
and concluded that Royster Guano Co. "depended upon the 'traditional' equal protection
standard which evolved during that era . . . when governmental economic regulations were
constantly being challenged on equal protection grounds." 367 F. Supp. at 988.

1975]

KAHN V. SHEVIN

where, as here, the legislative history is subject to different interpretations," 3 the court accepted the government's contention that the
provision in question was reasonably related to the purpose of rectifying effects of past discrimination against women.
Having determined that the mother's insurance benefits section satisfied the traditional equal protection test, the Wiesenfeld
court was nevertheless persuaded by the plurality opinion in
Frontierothat sex was a suspect category. The court then found that
under the strict scrutiny review standard the benefits provision violated the equal protection component of the fifth amendment. The
court pointed out that in reality the section operated to create additional economic disadvantages for women wage earners such as
Paula Wiesenfeld, since, on their deaths, their families received less
financial protection than would the families of male wage earners
who had paid the same amounts into the social security fund as had
Ms. Wiesenfeld.1' Disposing of a possible "compelling state interest" argument, the court stated:
While affirmative legislative or executive action may satisfy a compelling governmental interest to undue [sic] the past discrimination against such suspect groups as racial minorities, such action cannot meet the higher equal
protection standard if it discriminates against some of the group it was designed to protect."

The district court opinions in McEvoy, Polelle, and Wiesenfeld
demonstrate the sex-stereotyped assumptions upon which American social security laws are based. 6 Despite the ambiguity fostered
by Reed and Frontieroconcerning the appropriate standard of review in sex discrimination cases, the courts in McEvoy and Polelle
appeared overly ready to accept the argument that the provisions
at issue were in fact designed to remedy the effects of past discrimination against women and were thus permissible under the reason6 7 The
ing of footnote twenty-two in Frontiero.
Wiesenfeld district
63. Id. at 990.
64. Id. at 991. See also Ginsburg, The Need for the Equal Rights Amendment, 60
WOMEN LAW. J. 4, 11 (1974); Griffiths, Sex Discriminationin Income Security Programs,49
NOTRE DAME LAW. 534, 537 (1974).
65. 367 F. Supp. at 991 (footnotes omitted).
66. "The income security programs of this nation were designed for a land of male and
female stereotypes, a land where all men were breadwinners and all women were wives or
widows; where men provided necessary income for their families but women did not; in other
words, where all of the men supported all of the women. This view of the world never matched
reality, but today it is further than ever from the truth. About fifteen million households are
not supported by a man. Among families which are supported by a man ... almost half of
the wives are in the labor force. Forty-three per cent [sic] of school-age children and almost
thirty percent of pre-school children have mothers who work outside the home." Griffiths,
supra note 64, at 534 (footnotes omitted).
67. Cf. Polelle v. Secretary of HEW, NO. 73-C-774 (N.D. Ill., Apr. 19, 1974) (McMillen,
J., dissenting).
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court alone found the benefits provision before it violative of equal
protection on the basis of Frontierosince it discriminated against
working women as well as against men, a view shared by the Supreme Court in affirming the lower court's decision." The
Wiesenfeld district court thus did not have to confront the broader
'issue of whether a statute with a clearly ameliorative purpose with
respect to effects of past discrimination against women in employment could or should be found to pass the "compelling governmental interest" test.69 Not until the appearance of Kahn did such a
question surface, although neither that decision nor any subsequent
one offered any clear indication of the eventual answer.
B.

Domestic Relations Cases

On the state level, Frontierohad an impact in at least two cases
challenging alimony and property settlement statutes giving preferential treatment to women solely on the basis of sex. In Murphy v.
Murphy,70 a superior court in Georgia declared unconstitutional on
its face the state alimony statute that defined "alimony" as "an
allowance out of the husband's estate, made for the support of the
wife when living separate from him."' Based on its readings of Reed
and Frontiero,the court found that the statute, since it awarded
alimony to wives only, violated the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the federal constitution and similar provisions of the state
72
constitution.
In M. v. M.,73 however, the Delaware Supreme Court denied an
equal protection challenge to a statutory property settlement
scheme allowing a wife to share her husband's property after divorce
but not permitting the husband similarly to share the wife's prop68. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 43 U.S.L.W. 4393, 4396 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1975). See notes
136 & 137 infra and accompanying text.
69. But see 367 F. Supp. at 991 & n.29, in which the court analogized to affirmative
action race discrimination cases.
70. 42 U.S.L.W. 2393 (Ga. Super. Ct., Jan. 24, 1974), rev'd, 232 Ga. 352, 206 S.E.2d
458 (1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3571 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1975).
71. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-201 (1969).
72. The court held that the alimony statute violated the following state constitutional
provisions:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law."
GA. CONST. art. 1, par. 3.
"All citizens of the United States, resident in this State, are hereby declared citizens of
this State, and it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to enact such laws as will protect
them in the full enjoyment of the rights, privileges and immunities due to such citizenship."
GA. CONST. art. 1, par. 25.
73. Del. , 321 A.2d 115 (1974). This case was decided less than a week prior
to the Kahn v. Shevin decision.
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erty.7' Construing the Frontieroplurality opinion as "enlightening,
but not controlling,"' 5 the court stated that it need not choose between the traditional and strict scrutiny standards of review since
in its opinion the statute withstood both tests. In a somewhat unclear line of reasoning, the court began by dismissing the plaintiffs'
equal protection argument as being based on the flawed assumption
that "husbands and wives are physically and economically similarly
circumstanced" 76:
In the vast majority of marital situations in Delaware ...

it is the husband

who is the "breadwinner", upon whom the principal financial burdens fall; it
is his income and his opportunity and ability to accumulate wealth upon which
the economic stability of the household and the prosperity of the family chiefly
depend. In contrast, as a general rule, the wife is the "homemaker", responsible for managing the home and family and performing the domestic functions
which enable the husband to act as the main provider of income and wealth.
Generally speaking, each contributes in a characteristic and essential way to
the development of the marital property, much of which may become titled
in the husband's name alone. The financial realities of this time-honored,

husband-wife dichotomy are reflected, and compensated for in the provisions
of [the property settlement statute] which recognize[s] 77the differing physical
capabilities and economic contributions of the parties.

The court then characterized the objective of the statute as
assuring that the wife's contribution to the prosperity of the union
would be justly credited to her, and disposed of the claim that the
statute discriminated arbitrarily against husbands by stating,
somewhat illogically, that an award to the wife of a portion of her
husband's property was, "by definition, an award to the husband
of the remainder. 7' 8 While conceding that exceptions might exist to
the "general scheme of family life" it had described, the court stated
that the statute nevertheless was not infirm merely because better
legislative means of effecting the intended goals might exist. On the
basis of this somewhat disjointed line of analysis, the court concluded that the sex-based statutory classification scheme met both
74. DEL. CODE tit. 13 § 1527(a) (1975) provides as follows:
(a) When a divorce shall be decreed in this State:
(1) At the suit of the husband or the wife, whatever the grounds, the wife shall be
restored to all her real estate;
(2) At the suit of the wife on grounds other than nonage, voluntary separation or
incompatability, the wife shall be allowed out of her husband's real estate, personal
estate, or both, such share as the Court deems reasonable;
(3) At the suit of the husband or the wife except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, whatever the grounds, the wife may be allowed out of her husband's real
estate, personal estate, or both, such share as the Court deems reasonable.
75. 321 A.2d at 118.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 119.
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the traditional and strict scrutiny equal protection standards of
review. In an interesting footnote, however, the court expressed the
opinion that a "constitutionally mandated exception" to this conclusion might arise when there was actual prejudice to a husbandpetitioner who did not fit into the husband-wife hypothesis on which
the conclusion was based,79 and cited Murphy v. Murphy for comparison.
Frontiero clearly held impermissible a statutory grant of economic benefits to men based on the assumption that most men do
in fact provide the majority of their spouses' financial support. It
would follow, therefore, that state-designed or maintained alimony
or property settlement statutes grounded in the corollary assumption that all women are dependent on their husbands for support
during the period of the marriage and that upon its termination they
have no means of obtaining employment and own little, if any,
property in their own names should be equally impermissible.
Today many married women work and are fully capable of supporting themselves after divorce; not infrequently there are instances
where, as with the marital situation forming the basis of Wiesenfeld, the wife has a higher and steadier income than her husband
and has, in actuality, supported him during the marriage. Moreover, in many modem families it is not uncommon for the house or
other substantial pieces of real or personal property to be owned in
the wife's name for estate tax reasons. Upon divorce, however, if
the state has a law similar to Delaware's, the husband would not
be entitled to part of that property even if he had contributed substantially or exclusively to its acquisition. The wife nevertheless
would have a statutory claim (limited by the court's discretion) to
a portion of whatever property remained in her husband's name.
Despite the existence of such increasingly common contemporary marital lifestyles, and the FrontieroCourt's recognition of them
as invalidating the use of nineteenth-century stereotypes as the
basis for legislative classifications, the Delaware Supreme Court
decision demonstrates that, for at least some courts, Bradwell's
"law of the Creator" continues to exert a powerful influence.
Murphy v. Murphy, while appearing to signal a possible break in
the area of certain outmoded domestic relations laws, was reversed
on appeal on the basis of Kahn," and the only remaining hope for
men seeking to challenge divorce and alimony statutes granting
79. Id. at n.5.
80. Murphy v. Murphy, 232 Ga. 352, 206 S.E.2d 458 (1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W.
3571 (,U.S. Apr. 21, 1975). See notes 120-22 infra and accompanying text.
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women preferential treatment may be the eventual passage of the
Equal Rights Amendment,8 ' or resort to state equal rights amendments in those jurisdictions so providing.82
C. PreferentialPromotionalPracticesfor Women Naval Officers
In June of 1973, a three-judge district court in California unequivocally rejected the proposition that statutes granting women
preferential treatment should be tested by constitutional standards
different from those applied in Frontiero. In a decision that was
ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court, the lower court in
Ballard v. Laird3 held that naval regulations 4 granting women officers a minimum tenure of thirteen years commissioned service before mandatory discharge while granting male officers in like grade
and situation no minimum tenure violated fifth amendment equal
protection guarantees.
Examining the rationale underlying the challenged statutes,
the court concluded that the discharge provisions were in no way
related to the quality of service on the part of individual officers,
male or female, but were rather "legislative fiscal outlay saving
devices for the weeding out of a surplus of USN officers in a given
grade before the vesting of retirement benefits. 81 5 Also mentioned,
81. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YAE L.J. 871, 944-45 (1971) (hereinafter cited
as Brown). The proposed Equal Rights Amendment provides as follows:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
82. See, e.g., Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973). But see
Sampson, The Texas Equal Rights Amendment and The Family Code: LitigationAhead, 5
TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 631 (1974).
83. 360 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 4158 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1975).
84. The pertinent statutes involved provide in pertinent part as follows:
Each officer on the active list of the Navy serving in the grade of lieutenant, except
an officer in the Nurse Corps ... shall be honorably discharged on June 30 of the fiscal
year in which he is considered as having failed of selection for promotion to the grade of
lieutenant commander ...

for the second time.

10 U.S.C. § 6382(a)(1970).
Each woman officer on the active list of the Navy, appointed under section 5590 of
this title, who holds a permanent appointment in the grade of lieutenant ... shall be
honorably discharged on June 30 of the fiscal year in which(1) she is not on a promotion list; and
(2) she has completed 13 years of active commissioned service in the Navy
10 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(1)-(2)(1970).
85. 360 F. Supp. at 646.
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but not discussed at any length, was the government's apparent
contention that the thirteen-year commission tenure for women was
"a recruiting measure; ' 86 the court simply stated that if this was the
case, the "invidious discriminatory impact" was compounded.
The Ballard district court, citing Frontiero as controlling,
quoted from that portion of the plurality.opinion holding that sex
is a suspect category, and rejected the argument that the administrative and fiscal interests advanced in support of the naval regula7
tions could justify them under the strict scrutiny review standard.
The court expressly rejected any argument that laws favoring
women should be judged by different standards than those discriminating against them:
Whether the discriminatory impact results in favoring the female rather
than the male is no logical differential in the utilization of the teachings of
Frontiero.Diaz. . . and Rosen. . .each found no handicap in striking down
female favoritism under the civil rights act-a legislative implement of the
equal protection clause, nor do we here in a judicial implementation of the
equal protection clause."

The Ballardcourt thus did not attempt to justify the regulations as
having as a possible purpose the rectification of past underrepresentation of women as officers in the armed services, an interpretation that would have arguably allowed the provisions to be
upheld under footnote twenty-two of Frontiero.
The government appealed the lower court decision, but during
the pendency of the appeal the subsequent decision of Kahn v.
Shevin,89 in April 1974, cast some unexpected doubt on the appropriate standard of review for legislation favoring women. Given the
appellate dispositions of Wiesenfeld and Ballard and the recent
reliance on Kahn by lower federal and state courts in upholding
statutes granting women preferential treatment, a close analysis of
the Court's decision in Kahn is a prerequisite for assessing its subsequent and continuing effect on other sex discrimination cases involving legislation that favors women.
I. Kahn v. Shevin: A RETREAT FROM STRICT SCRUTINY
Melvin Kahn, a Florida widower, applied for a state property
tax exemption of five hundred dollars at the county tax assessor's
office, but his application was denied because the statute under
which he applied, while granting such an exemption to widows, had
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 647 n.1.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 647.
416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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no similar provision for widowers." Kahn then sought, and won, a
declaratory judgment in the state circuit court that the statute violated equal protection because the classification "widow" was based
on gender. Using Reed's "fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation" standard, the Florida Supreme Court reversed,
finding the object of the challenged legislation to be the reduction
of "the disparity between the economic capabilities of a man and a
woman." 9 ' Kahn then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
Writing the majority opinion, Justice Douglas, a member of the
Frontiero plurality, adhered to the Reed standard92 in holding the
challenged statute valid. Ignoring the issue of whether sex constituted a suspect category, the majority distinguished Frontiero on
the ground that the sole purpose of the Frontierostatute was administrative convenience, whereas the statute at issue in Kahn was "a
state tax law reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for whom
that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden. 9 3 Justice
Douglas cited figures revealing significant discrepancies between
median earnings of men and women as evidence of past and present
discrimination against women in employment, noting that the disparity in earning power was "likely to be exacerbated" for the
widow, since most widows on their husbands' deaths would be faced
with an unfamiliar job market and few skills to offer an employer
because of "[their] former economic dependency." In a footnote
the majority also referred to footnote twenty-two of Frontiero,which
had impliedly excluded from its holding statutes aimed at rectifying
the effects of past discrimination against women. 4 Concluding with
the observation that state tax laws have traditionally been granted
great deference on review, so long as the classifications involved are
founded upon a reasonable distinction in terms of state policy,95 the
Court affirmed the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White, the other members of
the Frontieroplurality, dissented in two separate opinions. Brennan
90. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 192.06(7)(1972) provides as follows:
"The following property shall be exempt from taxation:
"(7) Property to the value of five hundred dllars to every widow, and to every person
who is a bona fide resident of the state, and has lost a limb or been disabled, in war [or
military hostilities] or by misfortune."
91. 273 So. 2d 72, 73 (Fla. 1973)(citing Gruenwald).
92. 416 U.S. at 355.

93. Id.
94.

Id. at n.8.

95. Id.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

and Marshall, adhering to the basic premise that the statute in
question should be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny since the
classification "widow" was based on gender, stated that the Court
was not free to sustain the tax statute on the traditional "rational
basis" grounds. They further reasoned that the classification could
be sustained only if the State could demonstrate that the statute
served overriding or compelling interests that could not be achieved
either by a more carefully drawn legislative classification or by the
use of less drastic means. The two Justices then proceeded to find
a compelling state interest present in the goal of achieving equality
for a societal group traditionally "the victim of purposeful discrimination and neglect," and agreed that in providing special benefits
for such a group the statute served a compelling state interest. 6
Moreover, Brennan and Marshall agreed that inclusion of needy
widowers would not further the State's overriding economic interest
in remedying the economic effects of past discrimination for women,
since no one had suggested that needy widowers had suffered from
sex discrimination. Nevertheless, the Justices argued that the statute failed the strict scrutiny test since the state's compelling interest could have been achieved by a more precisely tailored statute
or by less drastic means. The section, they argued, was "plainly
overinclusive" since the tax exemption could be obtained by a financially independent widow as well as an unemployed widow with
dependent children; they also pointed out that by redrafting the
exemption application form to exclude widows earning annual incomes or possessing assets in specified amounts, the State could
narrow the class of beneficiaries to those widows who had actually
been victims of past economic discrimination.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice White argued that
gender-based classifications were suspect and that the State had
failed to prove a compelling state interest. Perceiving the purpose
of the statute to be "to alleviate current economic necessity," White
found it unconstitutionally both overinclusive and underinclusive
since it extended aid to widows who did not need it while denying
it to widowers with greater financial need and less access to jobs
than many widows.
In response to the "ameliorative purpose" arguments relied
upon by both the majority and Justices Brennan and Marshall,
Justice White refused to accept those arguments as a credible interpretation of the statutory purpose of the tax exemption provision:
"for if the State's purpose was to compensate for a past discrimina96.

Id. at 358-59.
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tion against females, surely it would not have limited the exemption
to women who are widows." 9 White further asserted that, even
accepting arguendo past discrimination as the criterion for current
tax exemption the statute ignored all widowers who had felt the
impact of economic discrimination, whether as a member of a racial
group or "as one of the many who cannot escape the cycle of poverty." In sum, the Justice clearly felt the equal protection clause
mandated nothing less than equal treatment for all persons similarly situated:
It may be administratively inconvenient to make individual determinations of
entitlement and to extend the exemption to needy men as well as needy
women, but administrative efficiency is not an adequate justification for discriminations based purely on sex. Frontiero v. Richardson• . .; Reed v. Reed
'S

A.

An Analysis of the Opinions

A careful analysis of the majority and dissenting opinions in
Kahn reveals, when compared with Frontiero,some disturbing and
unexpected analytical inconsistencies. Upon close examination,
Kahn appears to raise more questions than it settles and indeed,
leaves as unclear as ever the appropriate standard of review for
gender-based classifications.
The author of the majority opinion was Justice Douglas, who
had joined in the plurality opinion in Frontieroin stating that sexbased classifications were inherently suspect and should be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. While Marshall, Brennan, and
White adhered in their dissenting opinions to this mode of analysis
in judging the gender-based classification in Kahn, Douglas's majority opinion employed language from Reed99 and sustained the
statute on the ground that it was reasonably designed to further a
legitimate state interest. Douglas's refusal to adhere consistently to
the standard of review for sex discrimination he adopted in
Frontiero might be due to reluctance on his part to accept "remedying the past effects of discrimination" as a compelling state interest
in order to uphold the statute. 0 Yet his retreat from the position
taken in Frontiero not only creates a logical inconsistency with respect to his own stand in the two cases, but also substantially weakens the previous trend in the Court towards treating sex as an inherently suspect category.
97. Id. at 361
98.

Id.

99. Id. at 355.
100. See note 112 infra and accompanying text.
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Although Frontiero ringingly denounced the "romantic paternalism" inherent in early sex discrimination cases such as Bradwell,
the majority opinion in Kahn v. Shevin suffers from a more subtle
variation of that same attitude. As pointed out in Justice White's
dissent,"' the presumption behind both the statute at issue and
majority opinion upholding it is that all widows are financially more
needy and less trained or less ready for the job market than men.
Both Reed and Frontiero,however, explicitly rejected the argument
that legislatures should be allowed to pass laws grounded in the
assumption (and purely apart from the arguments of administrative
convenience) that men as a group are more likely to be better qualified as administrators because they are usually more conversant in
business affairs,0 2 or that American wives are more likely to be
financially dependent on their husbands, while husbands are rarely
likely to be dependent upon their wives.' 3
From the foregoing analysis of Reed and Frontiero it appears
likely that the primary argument saving the tax exemption statute
at issue in Kahn was that it was designed to rectify the effects of
past discrimination against women in the job market. Upon close
examination, however, several problems are inherent in accepting
this explanation as a "saving" statutory purpose.
First, ascertaining the purpose of a statute such as the one
involved in Kahn is never an easy task, since few states maintain
documented legislative histories of their adopted laws. The majority
opinion itself stated that Florida had provided some form of
property-tax exemption for widows since at least 1885,104 and that
the statute at issue had been essentially unchanged since 1941.15
Thus to construe the tax exemption statute as having been designed
by the state's founding fathers or by the 1941 legislature to alleviate
the past effects of job market discrimination against women would
attribute to those groups a degree of concern and enlightened attitude toward the status of women outside the home that taxes credulity. White's reading of the exemption as designed "to alleviate
current economic necessity" seems equally as arguable if not more
plausible.
101. 416 U.S. at 360-61.
102. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973) (discussing Reed).
103. Id. at 689 & n.23.
104. Article IX, § 9 of the 1885 Florida Constitution provided that:
There shall be exempt from taxation property to the value of two hundred dollars to
every widow that has a family dependent on her for support, and to every person that
has lost a limb or been disabled in war or by misfortune.
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352 n.1 (1974).
105. 416 U.S. at 352:
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Even assuming arguendo that rectification of past discrimination was the legislative purpose in enacting the statute at issue in
Kahn, other questions, unsatisfactorily treated by the majority
opinion, deserve consideration. The majority, as noted previously,
failed to articulate the precise standard of review to be used in
judging statutory sex-based classifications. Douglas's apparent use
of the "strengthened rational basis" standard in Reed allowed him
to accept as sufficient the proferred "ameliorative" statutory objective without having to elevate that objective to the level of a compelling state interest. Had he adhered to the strict scrutiny standard
he advocated in Frontiero,Douglas would have at least had to join
Justices Brennan and Marshall in insisting on a more precisely
drawn statute or the employment of less restrictive alternatives.
Justice White's dissent raises another telling point not answered
even by the Brennan and Marshall dissent: even accepting as the
statutory purpose the alleviation of the effects of past economic
discrimination against women, should not the legislature have
granted such a tax exemption to all women, not just to widows? The
statute does indeed create intra-class discrimination analogous to
that rejected by the Wiesenfeld court, and the'kind sustainable only
under the traditional equal protection "rational basis" standard of
review.
The Court's disposition of DeFunis v. Odegaard 6 only one day
prior to its decision in Kahn suggests some interesting problems.
Although DeFunis was vacated as moot, 10 Justice Douglas reached
the merits of the case in a dissent dealing with the central issue both
there and arguably in Kahn-whether a state may constitutionally
grant preferential treatment to a group which has traditionally been
the victim of economic and political discrimination to rectify or
alleviate some of the past effects of that discrimination.
In DeFunis, Douglas argued vehemently against the use of race
as a balancing factor, in and of itself, in passing on the qualifications of applicants to a state law school, and contended that decisions should be made "on the basis of individual attributes."', 8
Douglas stressed that clearly this method would not proscribe a law
school's evaluation of a candidate's prior accomplishments in light
of barriers he had to overcome, but insisted that "[t]he key to the
problem is the consideration of each application in a raciallyneutral
106. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
107. The plaintiff, Marco DeFunis, was in his last semester at the University of Washington Law School and the majority found that he was almost certain to graduate, regardless
of the decision reached by the Supreme Court.
108. 416 U.S. at 332.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

way."'' Douglas carefully distinguished school desegregation cases
0
such as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,"
which had held that public school authorities could prescribe a
specific ratio of black to white students for each school in the district, matching the proportion for the district as a whole, on the
ground that the Swann policy impinged on no constitutional rights
because no one was excluded from school and there is no right to
attend a segregated school."'
Although Douglas stated that there was "no showing that the
purpose of the [law] school's policy was to eliminate arbitrary and
irrelevant barriers into the legal profession,"' 2 that statement alone
is not sufficient to bring his DeFunis opinion in line with his stand
in Kahn. First, from his treatment of the "compelling state interests" argument raised by the state it is doubtful that Douglas would
necessarily find such a purpose sufficient to overcome the use of a
suspect category:
The argument is that a "compelling" state interest can easily justify the racial
discrimination that is practiced here. To many "compelling" would give members of one race even more than pro rata representation. The public payrolls
might then be deluged say with Chicanos because they are as a group the
poorest of the poor and need work more than others ....

The Equal Protec-

tion Clause commands the elimination of racial barriers, not their creation in
order to satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be organized.
*

.

.If discrimination based on race is constitutionally permissible when those

who hold the reins can come up with "compelling" reasons to justify it, then
constitutional guarantees acquire an accordionlike quality .... It may well

be that racial strains, racial susceptibility to certain diseases, racial sensitiveness to environmental conditions that other races do not experience may in an
extreme situation justify differences in racial treatment that no fair minded
person would call "invidious" discrimination. Mental ability is not in the
[sic] category."1

Even accepting arguendoDouglas's reference to the elimination
of "arbitrary and irrelevant" barriers into the legal profession as
signifying his willingness to find a compelling state interest in that
purpose, such a purpose makes the preferential admissions policy
at issue in DeFunis at least somewhat analogous to the types of
affirmative action plans usually upheld by federal courts in recent
employment discrimination cases."' The tax exemption statute in
109. Id. at 340 (emphasis in original).
110. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
111. 416 U.S. at 336 n.18.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 341-43.
114. E.g., Contractors' Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
950 (1972). Contra, Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D.
Cal. 1972). For a good discussion of these and other racial "reverse discrimination" cases and
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Kahn, however, does not constitute state action aimed directly at
eliminating discrimination (for example, legislation dealing with
employment opportunities for women). Since it deals with the
effects of discrimination rather than the elimination of the problem
itself, it is one step removed. At most, the Florida law at issue in
Kahn grants widows an economic benefit that when analyzed in
terms of its actual net effect cannot reasonably be said to be of
significant help to any taxpayer,115 male or female. Thus, the statute's practical utility as a device to "[cushion] the financial impact
of spousal loss upon the sex for whom that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden""' must consequently be characterized as
minimal at best.
The question thus remains why Justice Douglas is willing to
accord blanket preferential treatment to a group that in Frontiero
he characterized as suspect, analogizing sex to race, 1 7 while strongly
refusing to accord such treatment to racial minority groups in
DeFunis. Similarly, Brennan and Marshall, neither of whom wrote
an opinion reaching the merits in DeFunis, would have condoned
the granting of such treatment to needy widows in Kahn had the
statute been more narrowly drawn, although they explicitly adhered
to a strict scrutiny standard of review and found the ameliorative
purpose of the statute to furnish a "compelling state interest." The
apparent willingness on the part of three members of the Supreme
Court to sustain legislation granting economic benefits to a selected
subgroup of women, while failing to deal with the similar racially
suspect classification issue in Defunis, is simultaneously puzzling
and disturbing. The key to the result reached in Kahn may be the
size of the benefit involved, or the fact that a state tax statute was
involved;"' yet the underlying principles in the two cases are logically indistinguishable and the differing approaches taken by certain members of the Court in the two cases are difficult to reconcile.
B.

Post-Kahn Decisions

The effects of the Kahn ruling quickly appeared. Less than a
month after the Supreme Court announced its decision in the Flora comparison with the Washington State Supreme Court's opinion in DeFunis, see Note, But
Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others: A Look at the Equal Protection Argument
Against Minority Preferences, 12 DUQUESNE L. Rav. 580 (1974).
115. At the applicable tax rate in Florida, the savings to a widow applying under the
statute challenged in Kahn would be approximately $15. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Counsel for Appellant, to author of this Note, Oct. 17, 1974.
116. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974).
117. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682, 686, 688 (1973).
118. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974).
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ida case, the Georgia Supreme Court, relying heavily on Kahn to
reverse the result reached by the trial court in Murphy v. Murphy,
held that the Georgia alimony statute did not violate either the state
or federal constitutions."9 The court stated that the reasons given
in Kahn for upholding the widow's exemption statute were equally
applicable to Georgia's alimony statute, since that law was designed
to protect "the dependent wife of a broken marriage" who, like the
hypothetical widow in Kahn, would upon divorce find herself suddenly forced into an unfamiliar job market in which, because of her
economic dependency during the marriage, she would have fewer
skills to offer.'20 Quoting from a footnote in the majority opinion in
Kahn, which stated, "[w]e have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are
elected to pass laws,' 2' the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the lower court, observing that it was deciding "only
that. . . any modification or repeal of these alimony laws must be
made by the General Assembly of Georgia and not by the court."'2
The reasoning used by the Georgia Supreme Court in reversing
Murphy appears questionable at best. Even granting that the Kahn
tax exemption statute was grounded in a valid assumption that
most widows are older and have indeed been removed from the job
market for a significant period of time, a similarly valid assumption
cannot be made with respect to divorced women. Given the regrettable fact that in modern society many marriages end in divorce after
only a few years, it is much more likely that in most of these particular cases the wife has been employed during all or most of the
marriage and is perfectly capable of continuing to work and support
herself without an automatic grant of alimony. Indeed, the situation
that the Georgia alimony statute is allegedly designed to protect is
completely reversed in the not uncommon situation of a marriage
in which the wife has provided the entire financial support while the
husband has been completing a graduate or professional degree, and
the statutory assumptions are totally invalid. In such a case the
imposition of alimony payments on an ex-husband struggling to
complete his education would be not only unfair but probably finan119. Murphy v. Murphy, 232 Ga. 352, 206 S.E.2d 458 (1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W.
3571 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1975).
120. Id. at ___, 206 S.E.2d at 459.
121. Id. at __
206 S.E.2d at 460, quoting from Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 356 n.10
(1974) (citations omitted).
122. Id. The court concurrently dismissed a constitutional attack on a provision in the
alimony statute permitting an award of attorneys' fees in divorce actions to wives but not to
husbands. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 232 Ga. -,
260 S.E.2d 460 (1974).
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cially disastrous, and an argument can easily be made that in this
kind of divorce situation it is the wife who might be in a better
position to make alimony payments.
The Murphy court's reference to language in the Kahn majority
opinion that implied a return to substantial deference to state social
and economic legislation is disturbing since that language suggests
a possible retreat by the Supreme Court from a strict scrutiny review standard for sex-based classifications not only with respect to
those statutes favoring women, but in general.12s At least one other
court appears to have read Kahn and another recent Supreme Court
sex discrimination case, Geduldig v. Aiello,' 24 in the same manner,
and relied heavily on Kahn in sustaining a fourth (and probably
final) challenge to the benefit-computation formula in the social
security laws. In that case, Kohr v. Weinberger,rs a three-judge
federal court granted summary judgment for the government, holding that Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the same provision previously challenged in Gruenwald, McEvoy, and Polelle) did
not violate fifth amendment equal protection guarantees by permitting a woman to use three fewer "elapsed years" in computing her
benefit-computation years than could a similarly situated man. The
court reviewed the decisions in Gruenwald, McEvoy, and Polelle,
noting the intervention of the Reed and Frontierodecisions between
Gruenwald and the latter two cases, but ultimately rested its decision on Kahn v. Shevin. Declining to follow the Wiesenfeld district
court' 2 and apply the strict scrutiny test, the Kohr court instead
found the provision to be "well within the constitutional limits" set
in Reed and Kahn, since it was reasonably designed to rectify the
economic effects of past discrimination against women. The court
123. See also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 503 (1974)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). In Geduldig, the Supreme Court held in a 6-3 decision that
California's disability insurance program, exempting from coverage any work loss resulting
from a normal pregnancy, did not violate the equal protection clause. Justice Stewart, writing
for the majority, held that the program did not discriminate on the basis of sex, since potential recipients were divided into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons-and
while the first group was exclusively female, the second was not, and thus the benefits of the
program accrued to both sexes. Id. at 2492 n.20. In a dissenting opinion, Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Douglas argued that the program did discriminate on the basis of sex and that
consequently a strict scrutiny standard of review was required by Frontiero.Id. at 2495. It is
interesting to note that Justice Douglas thus reversed his position from Kahn and subscribed
to a dissenting opinion which stated, inter alia, "[tihe Court's decision threatens to return
men and women to a time when 'traditional' equal protection analysis sustained legislative
classifications that treated differently members of a particular sex solely because of their
sex." Id. (citations omitted).
125. 378 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
126. 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973), afld, 43 U.S.L.W. 4393 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1975). See
notes 59-65 supra and accompanying text.
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stated that because women indisputably have suffered discrimination in the job market in past years, the benefits paid out to women
workers, dependent on the individual's earning history, would necessarily reflect the effects of such discrimination. To the extent that
the challenged benefits computation formula corrected the imbalance caused by such discrimination, reasoned the court, it violated
no constitutional principle. In closing, the Kohr court noted that the
section at issue had been amended by Congress" 7 to equalize treatment of the sexes with respect to the formula as of the end of 1974,
and stated that this might be taken as evidence of Congressional
judgment that after ten years of experience under such remedial
legislation as the Equal Pay Act 28 and Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,2 9 further compensation for past discrimination in the
job market was unnecessary.
In addition to passing on the constitutional validity of Section
205(g) of the Social Security Act, the Kohr opinion engaged in an
analysis of Kahn and Geduldig v. Aiello that came to a disturbing,
if possibly reasonable, conclusion similar to that apparently reached
by the Georgia Supreme Court in Murphy regarding the appropriate
review standard for sex-based classifications. Both cases, the Kohr
court stated, "make it clear that the 'close judicial scrutiny' test
does not apply to cases involving discrimination [based on sex]."'' 3
The validity of drawing such a broad conclusion from the two cases
is technically arguable, since Kahn involved a gender-based statute
that favored women and had been implicitly excluded from the
holding in Frontiero, and the Supreme Court majority opinion in
Geduldig purported to find no sex discrimination at all. 3' Direct
support for the Kohr court's conclusion can be found in both the
Kahn 31 and Geduldig 33 decisions, however, leaving would-be liti127.
128.
129.
130.

Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 104 (Oct. 30, 1972).
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970).
Kohr v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also id. at 1304

n.6.
131. See note 124 supra.
132. "The dissents argue that the Florida legislature could have drafted the statute
differently, so that its purpose would have been accomplished more precisely. But the issue
of course is not whether the statute could have been drafted more wisely, but whether the
lines chosen are within constitutional limits. The dissent would use the Equal Protection
Clause for reinstating notions of substantive due process that have been repudiated. 'We have
returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social
and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.'"
416 U.S. at 3356 n.10 (citations omitted).
133. "The Court's decision threatens to return men and women to a time when 'traditional' equal protection analysis sustained legislative classifications that treated differently
members of a particular sex solely because of their sex. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon . . .;
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gants in future sex discrimination cases with legitimate doubts as
to the constitutional standard their challenges will have to meet.
Thus, at least with respect to statutes economically favoring
women over men, and possibly with respect to sex discrimination in
general, Kahn appears to have generated the impression among
lower state and federal courts that romantic paternalism is once
again an acceptable basis for legislation-that legislatures may validly pass laws based on traditional assumptions of economic dependency of women as wives and mothers and economic superiority
of men as breadwinning husbands and fathers, without regard to the
economic realities of modern life.
Certain questions remain unresolved, demanding at least a
brief exploration: the effect of Kahn on subsequent Supreme Court
sex discrimination cases decided this term; further possible effects
of the decision on various state domestic relations laws; and
whether, apart from the question of its analytical soundness, Kahn
represents either a socially or legally desirable and workable standard of treatment for women or any other previously disadvantaged
minority group.'3 The last section of this Note will attempt to deal
with these questions, although it does not purport to provide the
best or only answers.
IV.
A.

Kahn's IMPLICATIONS

FOR THE FUTURE

The Recent Supreme Court Cases

The impact of Kahn's underlying principle was evidenced again
this term in the Supreme Court's disposition of Ballard and
Wiesenfeld. The Court's opinions in these two sex discrimination
cases'35 indicate a further retreat from acceptance of sex as a "suspect category" by a majority of the Court, at least in cases in which
five justices could be persuaded that the statute at issue was deGoesaert v. Cleary ...

; Hoyt v. Florida

....

"

417 U.S. at 503 (Brennan, J., dissenting),

(citations omitted).
134.

Although constituting 51% of the American population, women can legitimately

be considered a minority group in terms of having been singled out from society on the basis
of physical or cultural characteristics, for differential and unequal treatment. See Hacker,

Women as a Minority Group, in SEx
135.

ROLES IN LAW AND

Socry (L. Kanowitz ed. 1973).

In a third major sex-based classification case heard this term, Taylor v. Louisiana,

43 U.S.L.W. 4167 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1975), the Supreme Court effectively overruled Hoyt v.
Florida by invalidating a jury duty exemption statute for women virtually identical to that
in Hoyt. While the statutory exemption at issue in Taylor was undoubtedly based on the same
kind of stereotyped assumptions concerning the role of women that were unhesitatingly

expressed in Hoyt, and which also underpin the majority's reasoning in Kahn, the Court's
decision in Taylor was based on the sixth amendment guarantee of a fair and impartial jury

trial, which the Court construed to encompass the right to a jury drawn from a fair crosssection of the community, including women. Id. at 4170.
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signed to compensate women disadvantaged with respect to career
advancement or job placement.
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,13 1 the Court unanimously affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the social security
"mother's insurance benefits provision" violated the equal protection component of the fifth amendment. Relying heavily on
Frontiero,the majority opinion characterized the statute as being
impermissibly based on the "archaic and overbroad" generalization
that the husband is always the primary provider in the family unit,
and rejected the government's Kahn-based argument that the statute was designed to compensate women beneficiaries as a group for
the economic difficulties faced by women in the job market. The
Court stated that "the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory
purpose" would not suffice, and concluded after an examination of
the relevant legislative history that the purpose behind section
402(g) was "to provide children deprived of one parent with the
opportunity for the personal attention of the other"1 37 by providing
benefits that would enable the surviving parent to stay home and
care for the children in lieu of working. The Court also emphasized
that the statutory provision in question actually discriminated
against working women, since they not only failed in the event of
their deaths to get an equal return for their families in comparison
with similarly situated men, but also were forced to make contributions to a fund out of which benefits would be paid to others. Kahn
was thus logically distinguished on two grounds: lack of a compensatory purpose for the challenged statute, and a discriminatory effect on working women, as well as men.
The Court's decision in Schlesinger v. Ballard,138 however, provides a sharp contrast to the approach taken in Wiesenfeld. By a
five-to-four margin 39 the Court reversed the three-judge district
court, ruling that the challenged mandatory discharge regulations
did not violate fifth amendment equal protection guarantees. The
majority recognized that, since female line officers are subject to
restrictions on participation in combat and sea duty, they do not
have opportunities for professional service equal to those of male
officers. Given this state of affairs, the Court hypothesized that
Congress "may. . . quite rationally have believed that women line
officers had less opportunity for promotion than did their male
136. 43 U.S.L.W. 4393 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1975).
137. Id. at 4397.
138. 43 U.S.L.W. 4158 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1975).
139. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell,
Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger; Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White dissented.
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counterparts, and that a longer period of tenure for women officers
would, therefore, be consistent with the goal [of providing] woman
officers with fair and equitable career advancement programs."' 4
Disagreeing with the lower court's conclusion that the challenged
regulations could be justified only on the basis of administrative
convenience, the majority stated that the mandatory discharge provisions furthered a flow of promotions commensurate with the
Navy's current needs and served to motivate commissioned officers
in a competitive manner likely to result in promotion.' 4 '
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent as he had in Kahn,
began by reiterating the Frontieroplurality position that legislative
classifications premised solely on gender must be subjected to close
judicial scrutiny. Taking issue with the majority's assertion of the
existence of a compensatory purpose behind the statutory scheme,
the dissent examined both the statute itself and pertinent portions
of legislative history, making a highly persuasive argument that
Congress did not have the intent imputed by the majority."' Furthermore, noted the dissent, even if the majority was correct in its
reading of Congressional intent, Kahn would furnish no support for
upholding the challenged regulations since, contrary to the assertions of the majority opinion, women do not compete directly with
men for promotion in the Navy.4 3 Thus unable to find a factual
basis upon which a compensatory purpose could operate, the dissent
concluded that the sex-based discrepancy in the regulations served
no rational, much less compelling purpose.
While the Court's unanimous decision in Wiesenfeld was logically inescapable, even under Kahn, given the relatively clear legislative history of the statutory provision and its discriminatory effect
on part of the group it allegedly benefitted, the Ballard opinion
demonstrates the subtle but important aftereffects of Kahn. A majority of the Court has demonstrated its willingness to hypothesize
(in its own words) a compensatory purpose for regulations that,
although not grounded in a presumption of female dependency as
in Kahn or Frontiero,result in a highly significant discrepancy in
terms of the size of the benefits available solely to women.'44 Even
140. 43 U.S.L.W. 4158, 4161-62 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1975).
141. Id. at 4162.
142. Id. at 4163-64.
143. "[S]election boards for women are separately convened, 10 U.S.C. § 5704, the
number of women officers to be selected for promotion is separately determined, 10 U.S.C. §
5760, promotion zones for women are separately designated, 10 U.S.C. § 5764, and women's
fitness for promotion is judged as compared to other women, 10 U.S.C. § 5707." Id. at 4165.
144. As one of its findings of fact, the lower court in Ballardstated that the plaintiff's
discharge under the challenged regulations would entitle him to severance pay of approximately $15,000, as opposed to the approximately $200,000 of benefits that would accrue to
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more significant and alarming is the confusion engendered by the
apparent virtual abandonment of the Frontiero "suspect classification" approach by a majority of the court in Ballard, in favor of a
standard that appears14 to be no more stringent than the traditional
"rational basis" test. 5 The willingness of a majority of the Court
to adhere to a principle upholding statutes favoring women when
the stakes are indisputably high once again raises the inconsistency
of these decisions with DeFunis, in which the Court was reluctant
to adopt a similar stance.
B.

State Domestic Relations Laws After Kahn

As demonstrated by the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in
Murphy v. Murphy,'46 examined above, Kahn's underlying principle
could be extended to state divorce and alimony statutes grounded
not only in the husband's marital obligation of support 4 ' but also
in the questionable (in light of modern employment patterns) assumption that married women devote themselves exclusively to
work in the home, not outside it. By arguing that alimony and
property settlement statutes favoring women are designed to alleviate the effects of past discrimination in the job market, the states
in most instances will be able to come within the ambit of Kahn and
successfully defend against equal protection challenges similar to
those raised in Murphy. Kahn also offers courts in cases such as M.
v. M. "I a much simpler analytical approach for reaching the desired
result of upholding the statute than would be possible under a ReedFrontieroline of analysis. No longer will a court have to wrestle with
the issue of the precise meaning of those two earlier cases; instead,
as long as it can plausibly analogize the statutory purpose behind
him if allowed to serve in commissioned status the minimum 13 years guaranteed to women
officers similarly situated. Ballard v. Laird, 360 F. Supp. 643, 645 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
145. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 43 U.S.L.W. 4158, 4162 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1975). It is interesting to note in passing, however, that in Ballard Justice Douglas joined Brennan's dissenting
opinion arguing that all gender-based classifications are constitutionally suspect, a change
in position from his Kahn opinion that is explicable only in terms of his willingness or
unwillingness to find a compensatory purpose behind the 2 statutes involved-a distinction
that demonstrates even more clearly the danger inherent in Kahn's invitation to judges to
interpret amibguous legislative histories in favor of finding an ameliorative purpose when
none exists.
146. 232 Ga. 352, 206 S.E.2d 458 (1974), cert, denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3571 (U.S. April 21,
1975); see notes 119-22 supra and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Kerner v. Eastern Dispensary & Cas. Hosp., 210 Md. 375, 123 A.2d 333
(1956); Henderson v. Henderson, 208 Miss. 98, 43 So. 2d 871 (1950); Motley v. Motley, 255
N.C. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961); Milliron v. Milliron, 9 S.D. 181, 68 N.W. 286 (1896). See
generally H. CLARK, DomFs.TIc RLArioNS 181-87 (1968); Paulsen, Support Rights and Duties
Between Husband and Wife, 9 VAND. L. REv. 709 (1956).
148. Del...., 321 A.2d 115 (1974); see notes 72-78 supra and accompanying text.

1975]

KAHN V. SHEVIN

the domestic relations law at issue to that purpose successfully advanced on behalf of the Florida property-tax exemption, the statute
may be upheld with a simple citation to Kahn. That such an approach can serve only to perpetuate the sort of inequities discussed
previously is clear, but the existence of Kahn provides an inviting
escape hatch for state courts that in the future face challenges to
domestic relations statutes favoring women.
States that have passed equal rights amendments to their own
constitutions,' however, may find that such statutes violate those
amendments even though they do not violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Wiegand v. Wiegand,'5 for
example, the Pennsylvania Superior Court interpreted the Equality
of Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution 5 ' as requiring the invalidation of sections of the state's divorce laws granting
wives in a divorce action, but not husbands, divorce from bed and
52
board, along with alimony pendente lite, counsel fees, and costs.
A divided court held that the amendment specifically stated that
equality of rights under the law was not to be abridged on the basis
of sex, and that no exception was made for rights in the area of
domestic relations. 53 The court quoted with approval from an earlier lower court case holding the same statutory provisions violative
of the amendment:
The basic principle of the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment is that sex
is not a permissible factor in determining the legal rights of women, or of men
. . . . [Tihe treatment of any person by the law may not be based upon the
circumstances that such person is of one sex or the other. The law does, of
course, impose different benefits or different burdens upon different members

of the society. That differentiation in treatment may rest upon particular traits
of the persons affected, such as strength, intelligence, and the like. But under
the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment the existence of such a characteristic . . . to a greater degree in one sex does not justify classification by sex
rather than by the particular characteristic or trait . . .

Wiegand was not appealed and thus the highest court in Pennsylvania has yet to interpret the effect of the state's equal rights
amendment on its domestic relations statutory scheme, but the
superior court's decision remains good law and demonstrates the
added utility of such a constitutional amendment in the face of the
149.
150.
151.
wealth of

See note 155 infra.
226 Pa. Super. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973).
"Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the CommonPennsylvania because of the sex of the individual." PENN. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
152. 23 P _N. STAT. ANN. §§ 11 & 46 (1955).
153. 226 Pa. Super. at , 310 A.2d at 429.
154. Id. at ,___310 A.2d at 430 (quoting from Corso v. Corso, 120 P.L.J. 183, (Penn. Ct. Cmn. Pleas 1972)).
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Kahn decision. Since the number of states with similar equal rights
amendments continues to grow, 55 Wiegand could conceivably presage a change in challenges to divorce and property settlement laws
favoring women.
C.

The Case Against Extending Kahn

The analytical and conceptual inconsistencies between Kahn
and Frontiero have already been discussed, 56 and need not be repeated here. A continued acceptance and extension of Kahn by the
courts, however, is likely to raise certain practical problems and
policy questions that will likely be difficult to resolve. Furthermore,
unquestioning judicial adherence to the underlying assumptions in
Kahn and reliance upon them in other contexts will act as a barrier
to the full development of a legal system in which individual rights
are governed not solely by sex but by individual capabilities and
characteristics. The following problems will demonstate some of the
sociological and legal implications inherent in any further extension
of Kahn.
One of the initial problems created by Kahn is its implicit
invitation to courts and litigants to attribute "ameliorative" purposes that may or may not have a basis in fact to gender-based
statutes. The Florida property tax exemption provision for widows,
as even the Kahn majority admitted, had its origins in the 1880's
and has been virtually unchanged since 1941, two dates which
scarcely lend support to the successfully asserted construction that
it had been designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination
against women in the job market. In Polelle v. Secretary of HEW,5 '
the dissent observed that the majority had simply assumed, without
any supporting evidence in the record, that the Congressional purpose in adopting the sex-based differential in the benefits computation formula was to compensate women for the lower wages which
they had previously earned, and argued that the differential might
have been adopted for other reasons, including the impermissible
motive of "romantic paternalism" that formed the basis of the
5 State
Gruenwald decision but was implicitly rejected in Frontiero.'
155. As of late 1974, 15 states had enacted equal rights provisions or amendments to
their own constitutions. ALAS. CONsT. art. 1, § 3; COLO. CONsT. art. 2, § 29; CONN. CONST.
art. 1, § 20; HAWAII CONST. art. 1, § 21; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 18; MD. CONST. art. 46; MASS.
CONST. art. 1; MONT. CONsT. art. 2, § 4; N. M. CONsT. art. 2, § 18; PENN. CONST. art. 1, § 28;
TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 3a; UTAH CONST. art. 4, § 1; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11; WASH. CONsT. art.
31, § 1; WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 2 et seq. See generally1 WOMEN L. REP. 1.63.70 (Nov. 15, 1974).
156. See notes 98-118 supra and accompanying text.
157. No. 73-C-774 (N.D. El., Apr. 19, 1974). See notes 56-58 supra and accompanying
text.
158. Id., dissenting opinion at 2.
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divorce laws regulating alimony and property settlement payments
are more likely to be rooted in the traditional common-law obligation of marital support running from the husband to the wife' 5 9 (and
indeed, are likely to be intended to allow the ex-wife to remain
unemployed and take care of the children) rather than being the
product of enlightened legislative concern over alleviating the past
effects of economic discrimination against women. Most recently,
Schlesinger v. Ballarddemonstrated the continued willingness of at
least five justices to attribute to a statute a compensatory purpose
that the dissenting members clearly proved to be neither supportable from the legislative history nor as having any logical basis in fact
under the separate promotion channels for men and women naval
officers. Only in the Supreme Court's disposition of Wiesenfeld, in
which the statute's purpose was clear from the legislative history,
was the government unable to assert successfully the existence of a
"benign compensatory purpose."
Secondly, Kahn raises practical problems of the sort articulated by the dissenting opinion in Polelle:
The majority ...

assumes that Congress has abandoned the different benefits

between men and women as of 1975 because the effects of discrimination will
have been dissipated by then. This involves a doubly unsupported assumption,
first that wage discrimination generally occurred against women in employments covered by the Social Security Act and secondly that its effects will
disappear in 1975 ....

[I]f discrimination against women has been reme-

died, will a court hold that Congress can then use Social Security benefits to
compensate such minority groups as blacks or convicted felons for the wage
discriminations which they have presumably suffered? There is no end to the
problems which can be foreseen .... 110

The analogy to the DeFunis issue is clear. The controversy that
raged 6' prior to that case's disposition by the Supreme Court, which
remains unsettled because of the Court's failure to reach the merits,
is highlighted by the apparent willingness of at least seven members
of the Court in Kahn (although basing their opinions on differing
grounds)'6 2 and five members (or perhaps all)6 3 in Ballard to sanc159. See cases and materials cited in note 149 supra.
160. Polelle v. Secretary of HEW, No. 73-C-774 (N.D. Ill., Apr. 19, 1974), dissenting
opinion at 4-5 (McMillen, J.).
161. See, e.g., Comment, The Myth of Reverse Race Discrimination:An Historical
Perspective, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 319, 331-35 (1974); Note, But Some Animals Are More
Equal Than Others:A Look at the Equal ProtectionArgument Against MinorityPreferences,
12 DUQUFSNE L. RFv. 580, 583-86 (1974); Note, Ameliorative Racial Classifications Under the
Equal ProtectionClause: DeFunis v. Odegaard, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1126 (1973).
162. The majority Justices apparently accepted the ameliorative purpose as a legitimate state interest, while Justices Brennan and Marshall indicated a willingness to consider
the same goal as a compelling state interest, although they still would have required the
statute to be more narrowly drawn in order to pass constitutional muster under the strict
scrutiny test.
163. Brennan's dissent, in which Douglas, Marshall, and (to a large extent) White
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tion preferential treatment for one previously disadvantaged minority, in contrast to their almost unanimous failure to take a stand on
the same issue in DeFunis. The two cases may be distinguished on
the basis of the size and nature of the benefit or preferential treatment involved, but such analysis is questionable after Ballard.More
importantly, it does not provide a ready answer to the questions of
where to draw the line and upon what basis-the particular minority group receiving preferential but compensatory treatment?
Whether the state action is in the form of a tax exemption or a
preference in admission to its institutions of higher learning? 64 If
the former, is the preference any less permissible if women are totally exempt from paying any property tax at all, as opposed to
receiving the effectively de minimus tax break granted them 6 ' by
the statute in Kahn? How can a court ascertain whether the alleged
"legislative purpose" of remedying the effects of past discrimination
has been accomplished? As Judge McMillen noted in Polelle, there
would indeed appear to be no end to the problems raised by the
seemingly harmless and "benign" principle underlying the decision
in Kahn.
Finally, it is submitted that Kahn is fundamentally at odds
with the slow but consistent progress evidenced in sex discrimination decisions in the courts of this country for the past century. By
subscribing to an underlying assumption that all or most women are
economically dependent on men, the Court has ignored significant
trends in the working patterns of American women, 6 ' undercutting
joined, included the following statement: "[W]hile I believe that '[p]rovidingspecial benefits for a needy segment of society long the victim of discriminationand neglect' can serve
'the compelling. . . interestof achieving equality for such groups,' Kahn v. Shevin, supra,
416 U.S. at 358-59 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I could not sustain this statutory scheme even
if I accepted the Court's supposition that such a purpose lay behind this classification." 43
U.S.L.W. 4158, 4165 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1975) (emphasis added).
164. It should be noted that the University of Washington Law School gave no preference in its admissions policies to women. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 324 n.5 (1974).
165. See note 115 supra.
166. In April 1971, approximately 32 million women, 42.7% of all women 16 years of
age or older, were in the labor force, compared with 28.9% in March 1940. U.S. BuREAu OF
LABOR STATIsTIcs, DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 34-35 (May 1971). By 1973,
58.5% of working women (whose numbers totalled 33 million) were married and living with
their husbands. U.S. WOMEN's BUREAU, DEPT. OF LABOR, WHY WOMEN WORK 1 (rev. ed. June
1973). This is almost twice the rate of 1940. U.S. WoMEN's BUREAu, DEPT. OF LABOR, BuLL.
No. 294, HANDBOOK OF WOMEN WORKERS 39 (1969). From 1960 to 1970, nearly half of the
increase in the labor force was accounted for by married women. Waldman, Changes in the
Labor Force Activity of Women, 93 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 10, 11 (June 1970).
Moreover, despite the discrimination against women workers still prevalent in the labor
market, many married women, like Paula Wiesenfeld, earn more than their husbands. The
Census Bureau reports that in 1970, wives earned more than husbands in 3.2 million or 7.4%
of American families. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1973, at 40, col. 1.
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the force of the mandate of individual treatment on the basis of
individual capabilities and characteristics implicit in Title VII'11
and in the Court's own previous decisions of Reed v. Reed"8 and
Frontierov. Richardson.'" The decision, while purporting to benefit
women, in reality helps to perpetuate the type of sex-stereotyped
judicial thinking that is reminiscent of the Bradwell-Hoyt eras. In
Kahn, however, the result of the stereotyping was to reverse the
usual pattern of discrimination, and to make men equal victims
with women.
V.

CONCLUSION

At this point, it seems somewhat unclear precisely what standards are appropriate in reviewing gender-based legislative classifications. The recent disposition of Ballard by the Supreme Court
appears to bear out the interpretation placed on Kahn by certain
state and federal cases 70 as signalling a return to, at most, the Reed
"fair and substantial relation" standard of review for gender-based
classification. Indeed, in Ballard the majority opinion appeared to
employ the traditional "rational relation" test, and made only an
oblique and limited reference' 7 1 to Kahn and the alleged compensatory purpose of the naval regulations at issue, thus casting some
doubt on the significance of the preferential treatment aspect of the
case.
Should the courts continue to rely upon and expand Kahn in
validating statutes favoring women in areas other than state tax
laws, it is conceivable that passage of the Equal Rights Amendment
could require invalidation of such court decisions. This result, however, is far from certain. 7 2 The Supreme Court's unanimous decision
167. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1969); Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1089, 1096 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Richards v. Griffith
Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338, 340 (D. Ore. 1969).
168.

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1974).

169.

Id. at 686-87.

170. E.g., Kohr v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 & 1304 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Murphy v. Murphy, 232 Ga. 352,
_ 206 S.E.2d 458, 459-60 (1974), cert. denied, 43
U.S.L.W. 3571 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1975).

171. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 43 U.S.L.W. 4158, 4162 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1975).
172. It has been suggested that "[a]uthority to remedy the effects of past discriminations as well as to implement the provisions of the Equal Rights Amendment is available and
unquestioned," and that courts would continue to have power to grant affirmative relief in
framing decrees in particular cases. Brown, supra note 81, at 904. The inference seems to be,
however, that "affirmative action" programs of the sort used to alleviate racial discrimination
in employment and education are the kinds of measures to which reference is being made,
rather than the legislative grant of purely economic benefits to women because of the past
effects of discrimination. The authors of this article, however, have postulated that at least
in the area of domestic relations issues such as those raised in Murphy, M. v. M., and
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in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld is unlikely to prove a panacea or a
substitute vehicle for passage of the ERA, despite the initial reaction from some voices in the news media. 17 3 Despite repeated references to Frontiero, the majority and concurring opinions clearly
applied some kind of "rational basis" test, since they characterized
the gender-based distinction at issue in Wiesenfeld as "entirely irrational. !' ' 7 None of the opinions stated or even suggested that
gender-based legislative classifications were constitutionally suspect. Wiesenfeld's result, therefore, while laudable, does not counteract the erosion of Frontierobrought about by Kahn and Ballard.
The decision in Ballard, and the apparent willingness of many
courts to find compensatory purposes for statutes granting women
preferential treatment indicates that Kahn is not a constitutional
aberration but a potential continuing influence on courts faced with
challenges to sex-based discrimination. Hopefully, the trend in judicial attitude initiated by Kahn will not continue to develop because
not only 'men, but also women, suffer from the judiciary's unquestioning reliance on outmoded assumptions about the economic capabilities of the sexes. Only by a return to the implicit requirement
of Reed and Frontiero to sustain only that legislation based upon
inquiry into an individual's abilities without regard to sex can the
commands of equal protection be fully effectuated and judicially
protected.
MARGARET ELZABETH CLARK
Wiegand, supra, the Equal Rights Amendment would not require that alimony be abolished
but only that it be made equally available to both spouses. Id. at 952.
173. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Mar. 31, 1975, at 37.
174. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 43 U.S.L.W. 4393, 4398 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1975); See also
id. at 4399 (Powell, J., and Burger, C.J., concurring) ("no legitimate governmental interest
. . .supports this gender classification"); id., (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("[T]he Government's proferred legislative purpose is so totally at odds with the context and history of §
402(g) that it cannot serve as a basis for judging whether the statutory distinction between
men and women rationally serves a valid legislative objection.").
In the most recent sex discrimination case to be decided by the Supreme Court, the Court
expressly left open the question whether a sex-based classification is inherently suspect, and
relied on Reed in striking down a Utah statute setting different ages of majority for males
and females in the context of child support obligations. Stanton v. Stanton, 43 U.S.L.W. 4449
(U.S. Apr. 15, 1975).

